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* Political gains for Egypt and Israel * 1978 Camp-David Accords |combatant1= |combatant2= Expeditionary forces: * Iraq * * * 〔 * 〔 Perez, Cuba, ''Between Reform and Revolution'', pp. 377–379. Gott, Cuba, ''A New History'', p. 280.〕 * ''Supported by'': * Libya |commander1= Golda Meir Moshe Dayan David Elazar Israel Tal Shmuel Gonen Yitzhak Hofi Binyamin Peled Haim Bar-Lev Albert Mandler Ariel Sharon |commander2= Anwar Sadat Hafez al-Assad Ahmad Ismail Ali Mustafa Tlass Saad El Shazly Yusuf Shakkour Abdel Ghani el-Gammasy Ali Aslan Omar Abrash |strength1=375,000〔–415,000 troops, 1,700 tanks,〔Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 372–373.〕 3,000 armored carriers, 945 artillery units,〔The number reflects artillery units of caliber 100 mm and up〕 440 combat aircraft |strength2=Egypt: 650,000〔–800,000 troops (200,000 crossed)〔(【引用サイトリンク】url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military///world/war/yom-kippur.htm )〕 1,700 tanks (1,020 crossed)〔 2,400 armored carriers 1,120 artillery units〔 400 combat aircraft 140 helicopters〔Shazly, p. 272.〕 104 Navy vessels 150 surface to air missile batteries (62 in the front line)〔Haber & Schiff, pp. 30–31.〕 Syria: 150,000〔 troops 1,200 tanks 800–900 armored carriers 600 artillery units〔〔〔 Expeditionary Forces *: 100,000 troops〔 500–670 tanks〔 700 armored carriers〔 Cuba: 1,500〔–4,000〔Bourne, Peter G. (1986). ''Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro''. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.〕 troops Morocco: 5,500 troops 30 tanks〔 52 combat aircraft〔 Saudi-Arabia 3,000 troops〔 Total: 914,000–1,067,500 troops 3,430–3,600 tanks 3,900–4,000 armored carriers 1,720 artillery units 452 combat aircraft 140 helicopters 104 navy vessels 150 surface to air missile batteries |casualties1=2,521〔–2,800〔〔Journal "الأهرام","Al Ahram". 14 October 1974〕 dead 7,250–8,800〔 wounded 293 captured 1,063 tanks destroyed, damaged or captured〔 407 armored vehicles destroyed or captured 102–387 aircraft destroyed〔〔"القوة الثالثة، تاريخ القوات الجوية المصرية." ''Third Power: History of Egyptian Air Force'' Ali Mohammed Labib. pp. 187〕 |casualties2=Egypt: 5,000〔–15,000〔 dead 8,372 captured〔 Syria: 3,000〔–3,500〔 dead 392 captured〔 Iraq: 278 dead 898 wounded〔Dunstan, p. 200.〕 13 captured〔 Jordan: 23 dead 77 wounded〔 Morocco: 6 captured〔 ---- Total casualties: 8,000〔–18,500〔 dead 18,000〔–35,000〔Rabinovich p. 497〕 wounded 8,783 captured 2,250〔–2,300〔 tanks destroyed 341〔–514〔 aircraft destroyed 19 naval vessels sunk〔 |notes= }} The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, or October War ((アラビア語:حرب أكتوبر) ', or '; (ヘブライ語:מלחמת יום הכיפורים) ' or מלחמת יום כיפור '), also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, was a war fought by the coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel from October 6 to 25, 1973. With the exception of isolated attacks on Israeli territory on 6 and 9 October, the military combat actions during the war took place on Arab territory, mostly in the Sinai and the Golan Heights that were occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967. Egypt and Syria wanted to regain the Sinai and the Golan Heights respectively. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat wanted also to reopen the Suez Canal. Neither specifically planned to destroy Israel, although the Israeli leaders could not be sure of that.〔〔 The war began when the Arab coalition launched a joint surprise attack on Israeli positions in the Israeli-occupied territories on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, which also occurred that year during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.〔 Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed ceasefire lines to enter the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights respectively, areas which Israel had captured six years earlier in the Six-Day War. Both the United States and the Soviet Union initiated massive resupply efforts to their respective allies during the war, and this led to a near-confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers.〔William B.Quandt, ''(Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 )'', p. 104〕 The war began with a massive and successful Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal. After crossing the cease-fire lines, Egyptian forces advanced virtually unopposed into the Sinai Peninsula. After three days, Israel had mobilized most of its forces and halted the Egyptian offensive, resulting in a military stalemate. The Syrians coordinated their attack on the Golan Heights to coincide with the Egyptian offensive and initially made threatening gains into Israeli-held territory. Within three days, however, Israeli forces had pushed the Syrians back to the pre-war ceasefire lines. The IDF then launched a four-day counter-offensive deep into Syria. Within a week, Israeli artillery began to shell the outskirts of Damascus. As Egyptian president Anwar Sadat began to worry about the integrity of his major ally, he believed that capturing two strategic passes located deeper in the Sinai would make his position stronger during post-war negotiations. He therefore ordered the Egyptians to go back on the offensive, but their attack was quickly repulsed. The Israelis then counter-attacked at the seam between the two Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt, and began slowly advancing southward and westward towards the city of Suez〔Hammad (2002), pp.237–276〕〔Gawrych (1996), p.60〕 in over a week of heavy fighting that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. On October 22 a United Nations–brokered ceasefire quickly unraveled, with each side blaming the other for the breach. By October 24, the Israelis had improved their positions considerably and completed their encirclement of Egypt's Third Army and the city of Suez. This development led to tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, a second ceasefire was imposed cooperatively on October 25 to end the war. The war had far-reaching implications. The Arab World, which had experienced humiliation in the lopsided rout of the Egyptian–Syrian–Jordanian alliance in the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by early successes in the conflict. In Israel, despite impressive operational and tactical achievements on the battlefield, the war led to recognition that there was no guarantee that Israel would always dominate the Arab states militarily. These changes paved the way for the subsequent peace process. The 1978 Camp David Accords that followed led to the return of the Sinai to Egypt and normalized relations—the first peaceful recognition of Israel by an Arab country. Egypt continued its drift away from the Soviet Union and left the Soviet sphere of influence entirely. ==Background== The war was part of the Arab–Israeli conflict, an ongoing dispute that included many battles and wars since 1948, when the state of Israel was formed. During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights, and the territories of the West Bank which were held by Jordan since 1948. On June 19, 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements.〔Herzog, ''Heroes of Israel'', p. 253.〕 This decision was not made public or conveyed to the Arab states;〔Shlaim, p. 254.〕 the public position of the Israeli government was that they were willing to return both Sinai and the Golan Heights, with exception of some strategically-important points, in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories. They rejected a full return to the boundaries and the situation before the war and also insisted on direct negotiations with the Arab governments as opposed to accepting negotiation through a third party. The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at Khartoum Arab Summit, was to reject any peaceful settlement with the state of Israel. The eight participating states – Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three no's": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King Hussain of Jordan stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states. Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War, and escalated into the War of Attrition, an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure. A ceasefire was signed in August 1970. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. A peace initiative led by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring failed to produce a lasting peace agreement as the Israelis repeatedly refused to make commitments to abandon territories prior to direct negotiations. In response to a letter sent by Jarring to governments of Israel and Egypt, Sadat wrote that Egypt would be "ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip", to "achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem", and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242. In addition, the Egyptian response included a statement that the lasting peace could not be achieved without "withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from ''all the'' territories occupied since 5 June 1967" (emphasis added). The UNSC resolution called for "withdrawal from territories occupied" intentionally omitting "all", and "the"; the Israeli response included a statement that they were not willing to "withdraw to the pre–June 5, 1967 lines."〔"(The Jarring initiative and the response )", ''Israel's Foreign Relations'', Selected Documents, vols 1–2, 1947–1974. Retrieved June 9, 2005.〕 Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered. Hafez al-Assad, the leader of Syria, had a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. After the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military buildup and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against Israel and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza, and make other concessions. Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history.... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."〔Rabinovich, p. 13.〕 In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai and was highly upset that Sadat had not launched one in his first three years in office. The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory as had occurred in the Six-Day War, in which Jordan lost all of the West Bank, territory it had conquered and annexed in 1948–49, which had doubled its population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the West Bank and Gaza and in the event of a victory promised Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970, a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war, Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, estranging Hussein. Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort because of its small army and already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for the war. By the fall of 1973, he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Yom Kippur War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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